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Abstract: The paper studies the relevance of gender ideology for the geographic mobility of 
families using data from the German Socio-economic Panel. The analysis proceeds in two 
steps. First, it is shown single men and women – who are in some sense "unconstrained" 
optimizers – reveal identical mobility patterns. There are no fundamental gender differences 
in the inter-regional mobility of German singles. Second, I focus on dual-earner households 
and split this group into "traditional" and "egalitarian" couples using information on their 
factual division of housework rather than their reported gender ideology. Separate migration 
analyses for both groups reveal important differences indicating the significance of gender 
ideology in families' migration behavior: job-related characteristics of men statistically 
dominate those of women in traditional couples, whereas in egalitarian couples, male and 
female characteristics have the same effect on family migration behavior, i.e. there is no 
gender bias. Failure to account for the heterogeneity in gendered family roles across families 
thus misses an important explanatory factor in migration research. 
 
Keywords: Division of household labor, dual-earner couples, gender ideology, migration 
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Gender Ideology, Division of Housework, and the 




The aim of this article is to study the determinants of family migration decisions, i.e. the 
decision to make long-distance moves (within countries but across regional borders). 
Specifically, I will assess the significance of gender ideology or gender-role beliefs for the 
inter-regional mobility of dual-earner households. Traditional gender-role beliefs imply that 
the husband should have the role of the primary provider or breadwinner. His labor market 
career concerns are of vital interest for the entire family. The wife, if at all employed, merely 
assumes the role of a co-provider. Her career is of minor importance, more or less 
expendable. In contrast, egalitarian gender-role beliefs ascribe the same importance to both 
partner's careers, at least in principle. The potential importance of gender-role beliefs for 
family decisions such as where to locate is obvious. If only one partner's job and career are 
deemed important for the well-being of the entire family, families will be less restrained in 
their decisions by losses of the partner who is the secondary provider. 
Economic and sociological family migration models differ in their assessment of the 
importance of gender ideology: sociologists think that gendered family roles play a major 
role in family migration decisions (Bielby and Bielby, 1992; Bird and Bird, 1985), whereas 
economists usually ignore this kind of concept (DaVanzo, 1976; Mincer, 1978). However, 
empirically, the differences between economic and sociological models are subtle. Mainly 
because married women usually have less favorable positions in the labor market than men, 
the main predictions are very similar: Dual-earner couples are less mobile than single-earner 
couples, because the wife's employment has some effect on migration propensities, but men's 
careers are more important in the migration decision. Hence women tend to lose (in terms of   4
their labor market position) in case of a family move. Economists assert that this is the case 
only because men's potential gains from migration outweigh women's potential losses 
(Mincer, 1978; Nivalainen, 2004). In contrast, sociologists argue that the relative importance 
of husband's and wife's job is not only a function of their income or labor market position in 
general, but also of the gender ideology shared in the couple (Bielby and Bielby, 1992; Bird 
and Bird, 1985; Morrison and Lichter, 1988; Shihadeh, 1991). 
The basic individual-level migration model endorsed by most sociologists and 
economists was developed by Sjaastad (1960). According to this model, potential migrants 
evaluate discounted costs and benefits of migrating to another region. If benefits outweigh 
costs (if the net benefit is larger than zero), the individual moves to the other region. Benefits 
are usually job related. Individuals move from low-wage regions to high-wage regions, or 
from regions with high unemployment rates to regions with low unemployment rates. The 
costs of moving are mostly in terms of leaving behind location specific capital in various 
forms – family, friends, memories, an so on. Sjaastad calls this the "psychic costs" of 
migration. Gains and benefits are thus not entirely in monetary terms. 
Although the Sjaastad model is useful in describing the migration behavior of men, it 
has limited value for the explanation of the regional mobility of married women. (Bielby and 
Bielby, 1992; Mincer, 1978; Morrison and Lichter 1988; Sandell, 1977, Shihadeh, 1991). 
The general finding is that family migration decisions are largely dominated by husbands, 
even if wives are employed. Individual (job-related) returns to migration differ substantially 
between men and women. Married men who migrate are less often unemployed after a move 
and they enjoy increased wages. In contrast, women are migration losers in the sense that 
they are less often employed, have given up a qualified occupation, or earn less after a move 
(Boyle, Cooke, Halfacree and Smith, 2001; Büchel, 2000; Duncan and Perrucci, 1976; 
Jürges, 1998b; Lichter, 1983; Maxwell, 1988; Morrison and Lichter; 1988; Spitze, 1984).   5
Mincer (1978) extended the Sjaastad model to families. According to his model, a family 
moves if and only if the sum of all household members' benefits from moving is larger than 
the sum of all household members' losses. In this case, each household member benefits from 
the move, either directly (e.g., in the form of higher wages) or because he or she receives 
compensation from other family members that undo migration losses. The Mincer model 
allows to distinguish four different situations in which family migration decisions take place. 
For sake of exposition, let us consider a two-member household with a husband and a wife: 
•  The net benefit of moving to another region is greater or equal to zero for each partner. In 
this case the family will move. 
•  Only one partner gains from the move and the benefits accruing to this partner are larger 
than the loss of the other partner. Because the sum of individual gains and losses is larger 
than zero, family utility is maximized by moving and hence the family will move. The 
partner who moves although he or she is losing individually is called "tied mover." In order 
to agree to the move, the "tied mover" must be compensated for this loss. 
•  Only one partner gains from the move and the benefits accruing to this partner are 
smaller than the loss of the other partner. Then the sum of individual gains and losses is 
smaller than zero and the family will not move. The partner who remains at his or her present 
location although he or she would benefit individually is called the "tied stayer." It is not 
clear if and how this partner is compensated. 
•  The household splits up if the sum of individual utilities is larger when both partners go 
separate ways rather than staying together at the same location. Although Mincer speaks of 
divorce, this needs of course not necessarily be the case. Dual-career couples also commute 
long distances, for instance on a weekly or monthly basis, to accommodate partnership and 
careers.   6
Although being rather simplistic, the Mincer model makes several empirical 
predictions that are well confirmed (DaVanzo, 1981; Lichter, 1982; Long, 1974; Nivalainen, 
2004): 
•  Single person households have a higher geographical mobility than couples or larger 
families. 
•  Dual-earner couples are less likely to move than single-earner couples, because the tied 
mover will suffer from disruptions of his or her professional career. 
•  Because of an inferior labor market position, women are more often the "tied" partner 
(mover or stayer) than men. Families move to accommodate the husband's professional 
careers rather than the wife's. 
Mincer's model of family migration has been criticized as being incomplete by 
economists and sociologists alike. The economists' critique mainly deals with the model's 
missing specification of the distribution of the resources in the household. For instance, that 
migration losers are compensated is simply assumed but not founded theoretically. This is no 
longer deemed acceptable in modern economic household theory. Households form because 
there are gains from marriage that leave each partner better off than when living alone. The 
distribution of these gains between husband and wife is now explicitly modeled as the 
outcome of a bargaining process (specifically as a Nash-bargaining solution; see Manser and 
Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981). Nash-bargaining is a formalization of the famous 
"law of personal exploitation" (Ross, 1921): the partner who has less to lose from a divorce 
will be able to extract more of the benefits of marriage. In the language of bargaining theory, 
the level of utility in the case of divorce is called threat point. (For simplicity, I only refer to 
the divorce-threat version of the bargaining model; another version, called separate spheres 
model, considers inefficient arrangements within the marriage as threat points; see Lundberg   7
and Pollak, 1996). Lundberg and Pollak (2001) apply bargaining theory to family migration 
decisions. As in the Mincer model, a family only moves if both partners agree to the move. 
But clearly, a family move will shift both partners' threat points. If one partner gains from the 
move (e.g. yields a higher income) but the other partner loses, the threat points are shifted in 
favor of the first partner. He or she has a higher income and on top of that gets a better intra-
family deal. So this partner will always agree to the move. But what about the second 
partner? Nash-bargaining implies that the second partner will receive a smaller share after 
the move, but the crucial question is: a smaller share of how much? If there are net gains 
from migration, the second partner will receive a smaller piece of a larger pie, which can or 
cannot be an improvement in absolute terms. Thus, even though family income would 
increase after the move, the anticipated change in the intra-household resource allocation can 
lead to a veto by the family member whose bargaining position is weakened after the move. 
Because a potential increase in joint income is not realized, the family remains at an 
"inefficient" location. This theoretical argument actually dates back to Ott (1992), who 
applied it to fertility rather than migration decisions. Ott showed that opportunity costs of 
women who have children do not only reduce fertility, but reduce fertility to suboptimal 
levels. The main empirical implication of the bargaining model is that families are less 
mobile than the Mincer model suggests. Some moves that are beneficial in the sense that the 
net gains accumulated across all household members are positive will not happen when there 
is intra-family bargaining. 
Sociologists have criticized economic models from a different perspective. They 
claim that the models are incomplete in the sense that they do not account for influence of 
gendered family roles on decision making within the family (Bielby and Bielby, 1992). In 
fact, both the Mincer and the bargaining model are blind to the gender of the family members 
who gain or lose. As long as the sum of benefits outweighs the sum of losses or as long as   8
both partners gain from the move, it does not matter if the move is made to foster the 
husband's or the wife's career. However, empirical studies from the U.S. have long shown 
that family migration decisions are asymmetric in the sense that – within the group of dual 
earner couples – women's job characteristics do not help to explain the geographical mobility 
of families. For instance, Duncan and Perruci (1976) follow couples of college graduates 
longitudinally and find no effect of the female partner's occupational status or her relative 
income on the propensity to move. Lichter (1982) studies the effect of the female's 
occupational status, income, and work commitment on the migration probability of dual-
earner couples. Of eight different indicators, only seniority had a significant negative effect 
on the geographic mobility of a couple. 
Gender ideology can explain these results as has been demonstrated in several studies. 
Bird and Bird (1985) report that men with egalitarian gender-role beliefs show more 
reluctance to accept a job offer in another region and less reluctance to move in order to 
foster their wives' careers than men with traditional gender-role beliefs. Women with 
egalitarian role-beliefs are more likely to report that a recent family move was triggered by 
her career concerns. They also report more willingness to accept a job offer in another region 
regardless of their husbands' jobs. Bielby and Bielby (1992) show that, independent of the 
partner's income, traditional men are more willing to move for their own career's purpose 
than egalitarian men, and traditional women are less willing to move than egalitarian women. 
But even among individuals with egalitarian gender-role beliefs, women are more reluctant 
to move for their own careers than men. Further, Bielby and Bielby find that, among men 
with traditional gender-role beliefs, the wife's income has no effect on self-reported 
willingness to move in benefit of their careers, whereas women with traditional gender-role 
beliefs become increasingly reluctant to move to benefit their careers when the income of the 
partner increases.   9
The above findings suggest that family migration decisions are asymmetric in the 
sense that men dominate these decision also if their wives have a comparable labor market 
position, because men mostly take the primary provider role. However, many of these studies 
only look at the self-reported willingness to move and only few are really longitudinal and 
analyze the relevance of male and female characteristics for actual migration behavior. It is 
unclear if self-reported willingness really translates into behavior. For example, Berger, 
Foster, and Wallston (1978) report that even in egalitarian couples of college graduates, the 
female partner often eventually followed the male partner. Apparently, the men had less 
problems finding a job after graduating from college. This suggest that egalitarian role-
beliefs can be too costly to be acted upon. However, it is unclear how far the Berger et al. 
results can be generalized because their sample was small and rather selective. 
In this article, I study if gender ideology matters for actual behavior using a large 
German representative panel data set (SOEP, see below). The question is whether traditional 
and egalitarian couples behave differently. Statistically, this translates into the question 
whether there are interaction effects between labor market characteristics – relevant for inter-
regional mobility – of men and women in dual-earner couples and their gender ideology. 
More precisely, the analytical strategy is to sort couples in two groups: egalitarian and 
traditional couples. In egalitarian couples, husband's and wife's characteristics should have 
the same effect on migration behavior. Consider education as one of the most important 
determinants of inter-regional mobility: an egalitarian couple that consists of a highly 
educated husband and a less educated wife should be as mobile as a couple that consists of a 
less educated husband and a highly educated wife. Egalitarian couples in which both partners 
are highly educated should be less mobile than couples with only one educated partner, 
because a move potentially affects the career of the tied mover. In contrast, if gender 
ideology matters, only the husband's education level should affect traditional couples'   10
propensity to migrate. Traditional couples that consist of a highly educated husband and a 
less educated wife should have a higher migration rate than couples that consist of a less 
educated husband and a highly educated wife, but the same migration rate as couples with 
two highly educated partners. 
The existing literature on family migration suffers from lack of information needed 
for such a test of the importance of gender ideology. Either there are longitudinal data but no 
information on gender ideology (e.g., Jürges, 1998a), or there is good information on gender 
ideology but no longitudinal data (Bielby and Bielby, 1992, explaining the respondent's 
willingness to move). 
The present paper contains two main innovations compared to earlier studies of 
family migration using the same data. First, I do not use "direct measures" of gender ideology 
such as the respondents' agreement or disagreement to items like "It is more important for a 
wife to help her husband’s career than to have one herself", "It is much better for everyone if 
the husband is the wage-earner and the wife takes care of her home and family", or "A 
married woman should refrain from working if jobs are scarce and her husband is able to 
earn the family’s living". Such direct measures are likely to be endogenous in the sense that 
individuals approve of such statements to justify the very fact that they are not working in the 
labor market. Instead, I will use the extensive information on time spent on household 
chores, both on workdays and on weekends, contained in the SOEP data. Because the 
husband's share in housework is often found to be larger in egalitarian couples than in 
traditional couples (De Laat and Sevilla-Sanz, 2004; Greenstein, 1996, 2000; Huber and 
Spitze, 1983), information of relative time-use is also informative on gendered family roles. 
This measure might be affected by covariates – such as the relative labor market position of a 
couple – that simultaneously influence migration behavior (Hiller, 1984). For this reason, one 
would feel uncomfortable using time-use on workdays. I will thus identify traditional and   11
egalitarian couples by the husband's share of housework done on a typical Sunday, where 
housework consists of traditionally female tasks (Greenstein, 1996): washing, cooking, 
cleaning the house, childcare, and grocery shopping (not so common on a typical Sunday in 
Germany because of strict opening hours regulations). Below, I will show in some detail that 
housework on Sundays is much less affected by labor market characteristics and more 
affected by gender ideology than housework on workdays. 
Another innovation is the operational definition of migration, i.e. the empirical 
distinction between residential mobility and migration. Due to a lack of information on 
migration distances, earlier studies have defined migration mainly by the motive of a move, 
i.e., defining all "job-related" moves as migration and all other moves as residential mobility. 
Fortunately, the access to regional identifiers in the SOEP has been facilitated recently, so 
that it is now possible to define migration more conventionally by the (approximate) distance 
of the move. 
 
DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
The data used in this study are drawn from the years 1985 to 2003 of the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP), an annual household panel survey of the private households in 
Germany (for a detailed description see SOEP Group, 2001; extensive documentation can be 
found at www.diw.de/english/sop/index.html). The data are collected in personal interviews 
as well as in self-completion questionnaires and contain a wide array of characteristics of all 
household members over the age of 16. Each individual answers his or her own 
questionnaire. There are thus no proxy interviews of husbands for wives or vice versa. This 
feature makes the SOEP particularly suitable for the analysis presented in this paper. There is 
not only detailed information on both husband's and wife's characteristics, the information is   12
also likely to be of better quality than if there was proxy information, e.g. on the division of 
labor in the household. 
The survey started in West Germany in 1984 with a net sample of some 6,000 
households (response rate at baseline: 63%). The sample has undergone two major 
extensions. In 1990, the sample was extended by some 2,200 households in East Germany. In 
2000, a refreshment sample was drawn in East and West that about doubled the total sample 
size to 14,000 households. 
The aggregate number of household-years across all sub-samples is about 150,000. 
For the purpose of this study, I have restricted the sample in various ways. First, for reasons 
explained below, I do not make use of the East German sample, which reduces the number of 
observations by 30,000. Second, I include only households with at least one economically 
active partner (self-employed, employed, or registered unemployed), reducing the sample by 
another 27,000 observations. Third, as is also explained below, observations in 1984 were 
dropped because of missing information (minus 4,600 observations). Fourth, because 
migration is measured as a move between two separate waves, all households that are 
interviewed only once or who change composition are also eliminated, i.e. couples who do 
not stay together across waves are dropped from the sample. The final sample has a total 
number of 72,472 household-years. A detailed sample description can be found in the 
Appendix. In all of the regressions reported below, cases with missing values have been 
excluded. No imputation, mean substitution, or other method to increase the number of cases 
in the analyses has been attempted, because item non-response is a relatively small problem 
in SOEP (e.g. a lot less than 5% for time-use data). 
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Dependent Variable 
The literature usually distinguishes between migration and residential mobility (Rossi, 1980). 
Migration is defined as a long-distance move (across regional borders), whereas residential 
mobility is defined as a short-distance move, typically within a town or other small 
geographic region. Because direct information on migration distances is lacking, earlier 
migration studies using the SOEP have distinguished residential mobility and migration 
either by the self-reported migration motive (Jürges, 1998a, 1998b), mobility across broad 
regional borders (Hunt 2000, 2004), or by changes in the size classification of the town of 
residence (Büchel, 2000). 
There is a clear relationship between migration motives and migration distance 
(Lansing and Mueller, 1967). Long-distance moves are mostly job-related, whereas 
residential mobility is mostly family- or housing-related. This finding justifies to restrict the 
analysis to job-related moves. Still, the reliability of self-reported motives to move is 
somewhat questionable. First, in the SOEP only one member of the household is asked. But 
motives might not be the same for all household members. For example, a husband who 
moves to accept a better job will certainly say the job was job-related if asked. His wife, the 
"tied mover", might beg to differ and claim that the motive was to keep the family together. 
Second, it is not entirely clear what respondents understand by "job-related". A sizeable 
number of moves for professional reasons is of rather short distance. 
The definition of migration as a move across regional borders also has drawbacks. 
First, long-distance moves within regions can be mistaken for residential mobility. Second, 
short-distance moves across borders can be mistaken for migration. The relative importance 
of both types of errors depends on the size of the regions under consideration. The larger the 
regions, the greater the potential for the first type of error. For privacy reasons, the scientific 
use files of the SOEP contain only the federal state as place of residence. However, many of   14
the 16 German federal states are far too large for a useful empirical distinction between 
residential mobility and migration. Households can move up to 400 km without crossing state 
borders. Short distance moves across state borders that are falsely coded as migration are 
presumably a smaller problem. Moreover, it can in part be dealt with by restricting the 
analysis to moves between non-adjacent federal states (e.g., Hunt, 2004). 
Fortunately, the research potential of the SOEP has recently been increased by 
granting researchers restricted access to regional data on the level of districts (Kreise), of 
which there are currently 440. In the following, I will use this information to compute 
migration distances. Migration will then be defined as any move across district borders that 
covers at least 50 km (30 miles) as the crow flies. The distance between districts A and B is 
calculated as distance between the capitals of districts A and B, respectively. Of course, this 
is only an approximation of the true migration distance and there is still potential for 
measurement error. A distance of more than 50 km between district capitals does not mean 
that a move between the respective districts necessarily covers 50 km. On the other hand, a 
few districts are quite large (especially in rural areas), with distances of 100 km from one end 
to the other. However, these are clearly exceptions. 
Overall, the use of district of residence information is a major improvement compared 
to previous migration research with SOEP data. The main drawback is that observations of 
East German households had to be dropped. In the course of far-reaching regional reforms in 
the early 1990s, the number of East German districts has been gradually reduced from 215 to 
111, involving substantial border changes. It is thus impossible to identify reliably the moves 
across district borders that took place until the late nineties. 
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Independent Variables 
Time use and gender roles. As mentioned in the introduction, I identify traditional and 
egalitarian couples by differences in the husbands' share of the couples' total time spent on a 
usual Sunday on traditionally female household tasks. Time-use on workdays is arguably 
dependent on labor force participation (Hiller, 1984) and thus endogenous to the family 
migration decision. In contrast, time-use on weekends should be less affected by the relative 
position of both partners on the labor market and thus be a more useful indicator of gender-
roles within the household. Assuming that nobody does paid work on weekends (which will 
of course not always hold), the amount of housework done on weekends is also an inverse 
measure of the leisure enjoyed by each partner. The time-use information provided in the 
SOEP based on the following question: "What does a typical workday/Sunday look like for 
you? How many hours per day do you spend on the following activities? (Please give only 
whole hours. Use zero if the activity does not apply)". Respondents are then given a list of 
seven different types of activities: (1) Job (including commuting), (2) Errands (shopping for 
groceries, etc.), (3) Housework (washing, cooking, cleaning), (4) Child care, (5) Education 
(also school, university), (6) Repairs on and around the house, car repairs, garden work, and 
(7) Hobbies and other leisure  activities. In my analyses, housework includes (2), (3), and (4). 
Because time-use on Sundays is only available about every other year, I use the households' 
information given in preceding waves where it is not available. 
In the empirical analysis of dual-earners' migration behavior, I split the sample of 
dual-earner couples so that about one third of all couples are labeled "egalitarian" and two 
thirds are labeled "traditional". The corresponding threshold is 37.5%, i.e., all couples in 
which the male partner's share in housework on a typical Sunday is at least 37.5% are 
classified as egalitarian. Note that this value is quite close to what couples perceive as a fair 
division of housework (Lennon and Rosenfeld 1994). Couples usually do not define a 50-50   16
split as fair. Rather, men consider a male share of 36% as fair, whereas consider a female 
share of 66% as fair. Still, one might argue that the sample split at 37.5% is artificial, and that 
results will depend on which threshold is chosen. I have thus studied the sensitivity of my 
results presented below by using two alternative thresholds: one low value, with a male share 
of housework of 25%, and one high value with a share of housework of 50%. As it turns out, 
the main results do not depend on the choice of the threshold. 
Education. Education is measured as the number of years of education. It is probably the 
most important determinant of migration behavior. This is not only because the labor market 
for highly educated individuals is more dispersed geographically than the labor market for 
the less educated. Also, social networks of highly educated people are more dispersed 
geographically than those of the less educated (Fischer 1982). The first information on a 
vacancy is often provided by friends or relatives (Granovetter 1974). The better educated 
thus also have better information on jobs in other regions. 
In the German context, it is common practice to compute years of education as the 
sum of years it usually takes to achieve the highest educational degree reported by a 
respondent, for example 10 years for lower secondary school, 11.5 years for lower secondary 
school plus apprenticeship. 13 years for upper secondary school, or 18 years for university. 
When analyzing the migration behavior of couples, it is important to study educational 
achievement of men and women in relation to each other. In some analyses, education years 
of both partners are thus dichotomized at 12 years of education and combined to reflect the 
education level of the couple. This variable has four different categories: (1) both partners 
have less than 12 education years, (2) only male partner has 12 or more education years, (3) 
only female partner has 12 or more education years, (4) both partners have 12 or more 
education years. In the regression analyses, the first category is used as baseline.   17
Seniority. The second important job-related characteristic used in the present study is 
seniority, measured as the number of years a respondent works with the same employer. 
Seniority reflects the amount of employer-specific human capital that a worker has 
accumulated and thus measures the costs of giving up a job and changing employers. Again, 
for couples, the variable is dichotomized and combined in a single variable with four 
categories: (1) both partners are working less than 5 years with their current employer, (2,3) 
only male/female partner is working less than 5 years with the same employer, (4) both 
partners are working at 5 or more years with their current employer. 
 
Control variables 
As household level control variables I use home ownership, household size, years of 
residence in the present house or apartment, an indicator variable for marital status (where 1 
= married), and an indicator variable for urban areas (cities with more than 100,000 
inhabitants) – all variables are known to be important determinants of migration behavior 
(see Greenwood, 1975, 1997; Lansing and Mueller, 1967). In descriptive analyses of the 
division of household labor, I also use individual wages, computed as annual labor earnings 
divided by hours worked, and per capita household income, computed as total annual 




Migration. Table 1 shows the distribution of migration distances by self-reported (main) 
motive for all households. Until 1996, Respondents were asked to report the main reason for 
their most recent move. Since then it is possible to report more than one reason. If more than   18
one reason was given, I have assumed the following hierarchy of reasons: job, housing, 
family, other. The first column shows moves for job reasons. Although only 13.5% of all 
moves are made for job reasons, they account for 64.9% of all long-distance moves, i.e. 
moves that cover more than 50 km. The average distance of job-related moves across district 
borders is 180 km. 
<about here Table 1> 
The most frequent self-reported motive is housing (e.g. respondents acquired or 
inherited a house or apartment, the former apartment was too small, too large, too expensive, 
poorly equipped, or badly located), accounting for 56% of all moves but only for 12.2% of 
all long-distance moves. 87.9% of housing-related moves take place within district borders, 
and another 9.7% are shorter than 50 km although district borders were crossed. The average 
distance of across border moves is 50 km. Family reasons (marriage, divorce, move out of 
parental household) are the second most important motive both for moves in general and for 
long-distance moves. About 9% of these moves are long-distance, accounting for 15.7% of 
all long-distance moves. The average migration distance is 96 km. There is still a sizeable 
number of moves with "other" reasons: respondents have been given notice by their 
landlords, rented apartments were converted to owned apartments, and other unspecified 
reasons. These other moves are predominantly within district borders. 
Table 2 shows annual migration rates and average migration distances by household 
type. Unsurprisingly, single households – who have an annual inter-district mobility rate of 
about 2% – are more mobile than couples. Couples are much less mobile, which is in line 
with the basic hypothesis of the Mincer family migration model. The annual migration rate of 
couples with a man in the labor force is .54%, a bit smaller than the migration rate of dual-
earner couples (.63%). The least mobile household type are couples in which only the wife is 
in the labor force (.17%). These are mostly women with husbands who are already retired.   19
<about here Table 2> 
Time use. Table 3 contains the average self-reported number of hours spent on household 
chores, shopping for groceries and childcare "on a usual workday" and "on a usual Sunday". 
Figures are computed separately for men and women, for households with and without 
children, and for different household types (singles, single-earner couples, dual-earner 
couples). Because time-use on weekends is not available in each year of the SOEP the 
number of observations is smaller than for time-use on workdays. There are several 
noteworthy findings in Table 3: 
•  Men spend considerably less time on housework, shopping and childcare than women. 
The average share is about 30%. Even if the husband is not in the labor force (but the wife 
is), he spends less time on these tasks than his wife (37 to 47% on workdays and 25 to 31% 
on Sundays). 
•  The difference between men and women living in couples is larger than the difference 
between single men and women, although the sum of hours is about the same. For example, 
on a typical workday, single men without children spend on average 2.1 hours on housework 
and single women without children spend on average 2.8 hours on housework. In dual-earner 
couples without children, men spend only 1.4 hours on housework but women spend 3.7 
hours. Intra-household division of work primarily benefits men. 
•  Men who are working tend to increase their share of housework on Sundays, particularly 
if the couple has children. For instance, husbands with children who are single earners 
increase their share from 14.1% to 25.3%, and husbands in dual-earner couples increase their 
share from 20.7% to 28.4%. In childless couples, the increase is smaller (from 14.8% to 
17.5%) if the husband is a single earner, or negative but small in dual-earner couples (from 
27.7% to 26.6%).   20
<about here Table 3 > 
Table 3 does not allow to conclude that hours spent on workdays and on weekends 
are inherently different. This is demonstrated in Table 4, which contains the results of 
regressions of the male housework share in dual-earner couples on a number of explanatory 
variables (Beblo, 1999; Hersch and Stratton, 1994).  
Housework sharing arrangements on workdays obviously depend on labor force 
characteristics. High wage men share less of the housework burden on workdays. The same 
holds for high wage women. The effects are symmetric in the sense that (independent of the 
partner's sex) higher wages decrease the share in housework by about the same amount. 
Hence, a one unit increase in the wage rate of both partners leaves the male partner's share of 
household work unchanged. Highly educated men share less of the housework burden on 
workdays, and men with highly educated women contribute more to the housework on 
workdays than others. If the number of years of education of both male and female partner 
rises by one, the male partner's share rises (significantly). Finally, if the couple is married or 
if the couple has children, the husband's share drops by 4 to 5 percentage points. 
<about here Table 4> 
The second model describes determinants of division of work on Sundays. Some 
general characteristics like age (or cohort), marital status or the year of the interview have 
similar effects on housework sharing arrangements on workdays and Sundays. However, 
there are also interesting differences: the effect of the female wage rate becomes somewhat 
weaker, whereas the effect of male wage rate vanishes completely. Male labor market 
characteristics thus appear to have much less effect on the division of work on Sundays. 
Interestingly, the sign of the effect of male education changes from negative to positive. 
Better educated men do a larger share of Sunday's housework than the less educated but the   21
effect of female education remains more or less unchanged. The combined effect of male and 
female education is roughly twice as large on weekends than on workdays. Given that 
education and egalitarian values are correlated (Inglehart and Norris, 2003), these findings 
are consistent with the claim that the intra-household division of work on workdays depends 
largely on labor force characteristics of men and women, whereas the division of work on 
Sundays tends to be determined by gendered family roles. Of course, the empirical difference 
between workdays and Sundays may be somewhat blurred because of "spill-overs" from 
workdays to weekends if part of the housework is shifted to weekends. 
 
Migration models 
Because the SOEP contains panel data, it seems appropriate to account for repeated 
observations by estimating panel regression models, i.e. fixed or random effects models (see 
e.g. Baltagi 1995). The binary regression counterpart to a fixed effects model is the 
conditional logit model. Unfortunately, the conditional logit model is not useful in the 
present application, because only households that have variation in the dependent variable, 
i.e. that move at least once, contribute to the likelihood function. The large number of 
households that never migrated during the observation period would thus drop out of the 
estimation, which is obviously not useful. The alternative is to estimate a random effects 
probit model. As the random effects alternative to conditional logit, I have estimated each of 
the models below as a random effects probit model. Apart from the fact that the random 
effects model rests on the critical assumption that the individual effect is uncorrelated with 
the other regressors – an assumption that is not often met in applied work – the estimated 
intra-household correlation coefficients were close to zero so that the other parameters were 
comparable to estimates using pooled data. I have thus decided to report only results from 
pooled logit regressions – however with standard errors that account for the fact that   22
households are repeatedly observed. Another issue that has to be taken care of is the fact that 
regional mobility is a major source of panel attrition. The regression results presented below 
account partly for panel attrition by using longitudinal weights. These weights (essentially 
inverse attrition probabilities) are available with the data. 
Single men and women. Despite the main interest in the mobility of couples, it is instructive 
to start by comparing the migration behavior of men and women who do not live with a 
partner. Single men and women might be viewed as unconstrained optimizers for whom the 
individual microeconomic migration model has a higher relevance than for couples. The 
comparison will yield insight into the main determinants of individual migration behavior 
serve as a starting point for the analysis of couples’ migration behavior. Table 2 has shown 
that the average annual migration rates of single men and women are very similar (2.07% 
versus 2.08%) and not significantly different. However, this result could be a matter of 
chance when different forces neutralize each other. It does not necessarily mean that men and 
women behave in the same way. Such a statement would only be warranted if the effects of 
important covariates on migration behavior have about the same size. 
<about here Table 5> 
Table 5 contains the results of logistic regressions of the probability of making a 
move of more than 50 km between two waves, separately for single men and women. Apart 
from general household characteristics that are known to affect inter-regional mobility, such 
as home ownership, length of residence, age, household size, or city size, I have included the 
number of education years and the number of years with the current employer (seniority) as 
explanatory variables. I also control for a linear time trend. The results are mostly in line with 
results known from the literature. Regional mobility depends negatively on home ownership, 
length of residence, age, household size (measured by the presence of children), and seniority 
(measured as the number of years working with the current employer). Individuals living in   23
urban areas move less often than others, and finally, education has a strong positive effect on 
the propensity to migrate. 
The main question, however, is whether these variables have differential effects on 
the mobility of men and women. This proves not to be the case. The null hypothesis of a chi-
squared test that the parameters of the separate models are jointly equal cannot be rejected 
(χ
2(9) = 8.97). Even when compared individually, no parameter shows significant sex 
differences (the effect of length of residence is significantly different only at p = 0.11). In 
other words: I find no major gender differences in the migration determinants of single men 
and women, in particular not with respect to job-related characteristics such as education or 
seniority. As we will see next, this result stands in sharp contrast to models for dual-earner 
households, where male and female characteristics have distinctly different effects on 
migration probabilities, at least in traditional couples. Gender differences found in couples 
must thus be attributed to some interaction of husband and wife's characteristics. 
Dual-earner couples. In Table 6, I show the logistic regression results for dual-earner 
couples, separately for traditional and egalitarian couples. In addition to general household 
characteristics, I include the number of education years and the number of years with the 
current employer (seniority) of both spouses as explanatory variables. 
<about here Table 6> 
In the first two models, the estimated parameters of education show some noteworthy 
differences. In traditional couples, only the husbands' years of education have a significant 
and positive effect on mobility. The wife's years of education have virtually no effect on 
migration probabilities, and the coefficients of male and female years of education are 
statistically different from each other (χ
2(1) = 8.61). This relationship is somewhat reversed 
in egalitarian couples: the effect of husband's years of education on mobility is smaller than   24
the effect of the wife's years of education. The education parameters are jointly significant 
(χ
2(2) = 36.4), but not significantly different from each other (χ
2(1) = 0.34). 
Of course, husband's and wife's education are highly correlated (Blossfeld and Timm, 
2003) and the parameters just discussed might not correctly identify each single effect. 
Models 3 and 4 – that contain male and female education in relation to each other – shed 
more light on this issue. As explained above, men's and women's education and seniority are 
dichotomized and interacted. The new variable has four categories, and thus enters the 
regression as a set of three dummy variables. Table 7 serves to illustrate the coding of joint 
variables and the tests discussed in the remainder of this section. In the following, let α, β, 
and γ denote the estimated logit coefficients of the respective dummy variables, e.g. α 
denotes the logit coefficient for a low male/high female education couple relative to the 
baseline category (low male/low female education couples). 
<about here Table 7> 
In traditional couples (model 3), the effect of high male education is positive and 
significant, independent of the education level of the female partner (β = 1.42 when the wife 
has low education, γ − α = 1.36 when the wife has high education). The coefficients of high 
male education categories are not statistically different (χ
2(1) = 0.20). In contrast, the effect 
of high female education in traditional couples is not statistically different from zero. This 
holds independently of the education level of the male partner (logit coefficients are α = -
0.07 when the husband has low education and γ − β = -0.13 when the husband has high 
education). To summarize, in traditional couples, female education has no effect on the 
probability of a family move. A very similar pattern is found in a recent study using date 
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID; see Compton and Pollak, 2004), although 
the authors do not consider gendered family roles.   25
The analysis for egalitarian couples (model 4) reveals striking differences. Now, both male 
and female education have a positive effect on regional mobility. The coefficient for female 
education is even larger than the coefficient for male education (α = 1.33 and β = 1.03, 
respectively), but not statistically different (χ
2(1) = .50). Furthermore, egalitarian couples 
with two highly educated individuals are more mobile than egalitarian couples with only one 
highly educated partner (γ = 1.39). However, if both partner's education had an independent 
effect on mobility, adding up both effects should yield the coefficient of a couple with two 
highly educated partners. However, this is not the case. Statistically, the logit coefficient for 
couples with two highly educated partners is significantly smaller than the sum of 
coefficients of couples with only one highly educated partner (α + β = 2.36); χ
2(1) = 3.47), 
but the differences between γ and either α and β are not significant. Having a highly educated 
partner does thus not increase the mobility of a highly educated respondent. It must be 
stressed, however, that this holds only for egalitarian couples and not for all couples (as the 
Mincer model predicts). In traditional couples, having a highly educated husband 
significantly increases the migration propensity of a highly educated wife. 
An alternative to migration often chosen by highly educated dual-earner couples is 
commuting. Table 8 – which shows average combined commute-to-work distances in km by 
education and implied gender-role beliefs – illustrates this point. Egalitarian couples travel 
greater distances to work, independent of their education level. The type of couple that 
commutes the greatest distances to work are egalitarian high education couples. 
<about here Table 8> 
Going back to Table 6, the results for seniority are not as clear cut as those for 
education years. In traditional couples, seniority seems to be no major migration obstacle, 
except when both partners are employed 5 years or more with their current employer (γ = -  26
0.68). In egalitarian couples, male seniority appears to exert a stronger influence on 
migration probabilities (β = -0.73) than female seniority (α = -0.16), but the differences are 
not significant. As in traditional couples, seniority has the strongest effect when both partners 
are employed for 5 or more years with their current employer (γ = -1.37). 
As already mentioned, I have studied the sensitivity of my results to the choice of the 
traditional/egalitarian threshold in the husband's housework share. I estimated all models 
with two alternative thresholds: one low value, with a male share of housework of 25%, and 
one high value with a share of housework of 50%. The results – shown in the Appendix – are 
qualitatively similar to those above. 
 
DISCUSSION 
In the present paper, I have presented evidence on the determinants of the inter-regional 
mobility of West German households and families using the German SOEP. Long-distance 
moves are predominantly job-related. About two thirds of the migrants in my sample 
reported job reasons as the main motive for their move. However, in dual-earner couples, two 
jobs are affected by migration decisions. A move that benefits the job prospects of one 
partner may harm the prospects of the other partner. Economic and sociological models of 
family migration behavior differ in their assessment of how these costs and benefits affect 
migration behavior. 
Earlier literature from the U.S. has convincingly shown that gender ideology, i.e. 
beliefs about who in a couple should be the primary provider, are good predictors for the 
reported willingness to move for job-related reasons although the move may harm one's 
partner's job prospects (Bielby and Bielby, 1992). Still, there is shortage of evidence that   27
gender ideology matters for actual migration behavior. The present paper aimed to fill that 
gap. 
One innovation of this study was to use data on the division of labor within the 
household on a typical Sunday rather than attitudinal data to identify traditional and 
egalitarian couples. Previous research from the U.S. has shown that the husbands' percentage 
of total hours spent on traditionally female household tasks is strongly related to gender 
ideology (Greenstein, 1996). Greenstein found that the division of household labor reaches 
equality only if both partners hold egalitarian ideologies. My research strategy drew on this 
finding when the sample was divided into traditional households (where the husband's share 
is below a certain threshold) and egalitarian households (where the husband's share is above a 
certain threshold). The rationale to use time-use on weekends was to get a measure that is 
(roughly) independent of hours worked on the labor market. 
The analysis of migration behavior proceeded in two steps: as a preparatory step, I 
studied whether the migration behavior of single men and women (who are in some sense 
"unconstrained" optimizers) is the same. The answer was no. I found no gender difference in 
the main determinants of inter-regional migration of singles. This is an important finding 
because it suggests that there are no fundamental gender differences in migration behavior. 
The next step was to split the sample of dual-earner household into "traditional" and 
"egalitarian" couples, as described above. I estimated separate regression models for both 
groups to explain their inter-regional mobility. The main result was that education (as one of 
the major determinants of inter-regional mobility) affects migration behavior differently in 
the two sub-samples. In the traditional sub-sample, only the husband's education has an effect 
on the propensity to migrate – independent of the wife's level of education, which has no 
effect at all. In the egalitarian sub-sample, husband's and wife's education affect migration in 
the same manner. The highly educated are more mobile than others – if their partner has a   28
low education level, but a high education level decreases mobility if the partner also has a 
high education level. This symmetry suggests that both partners' careers are taken into 
account in migration decisions when couples' gender ideologies are egalitarian rather then 
traditional. The results presented in this paper thus support the hypothesis that gender 
ideology matters for the actual migration behavior of German dual-earner couples. 
The main limitation of the current study is that, despite the large sample size, the 
number of migrant households is small. According to the operational definition chosen, only 
182 dual-earner couples are movers, which corresponds to an annual migration rate of .59%. 
The true proportion of migrant households is likely to be higher, because households 
systematically drop out of the panel when they move and their new addresses remain 
unknown. The small number of migrant households entails two problems. One is that little 
variation in the dependent variable affects the precision of the regression estimates. With 
more migrant households in the sample, some of the insignificant coefficients or differences 
between coefficients might have turned statistically significant. It is less obvious, however, 
whether that would have affected the substantive results. A related disadvantage of the small 
number of migrants is that the binary regression model has to be specified rather 
parsimoniously. Adding further job-related variables that capture potential migration costs 
and benefits but that are not crucial to the analysis will inflate standard errors of all estimates 
and increase the possibility of separating the model (see Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). A 
second worry is that households who move to a new unknown address are a selective group 
and their exclusion from the sample might bias the results. To check the sensitivity of the 
results I have included all households who moved to an unknown address as movers. This did 
not change the results presented above. 
Another limitation of the present article is that time-use (and thus division of 
household labor) on weekends was not available in each single survey year. The solution to   29
substitute the values in years without that information with data from preceding waves might 
raise objections. Although gender ideology is probably stable over periods of one or two 
years, the division of labor can change because of intervening events such as the birth of a 
child or changes in employment status. Table 2 gives some idea about how much the division 
of labor changes. For instance, the presence of children increases the husband's share of 
hours spent on housework by 1.7 percentage points. In my analysis of migration behavior I 
have dichotomized the sample at different thresholds. The proportion of households who 
would change categories in response to childbirth is thus very low (approximately 0.7 
percentage points) and it is unlikely that the main results are affected. Moreover, restricting 
the analysis only to those years in which Sunday data is available does not affect the results. 
Given the small number of migrants in the present study, several directions for future 
research come into mind. One possibility is to increase the number of migrant households on 
which to draw conclusion is to collect data from a representative sample of recent migrants, 
and to combine this data with a sample that contains non-migrants and migrants (see Bover 
and Arellano, 2002). Further. it would be extremely valuable if the study was replicated with 
data from other countries. A recent study by Compton and Pollak (2004) shows that similar 
results can be expected for example using the U.S. PSID. Household panel surveys now exist 
in a number of countries, but they do not exist as long as the PSID so that each nationally 
representative data set alone is likely to suffer from a small number of migrant households. 
Pooling several available data sets might thus be an attractive option.   30
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Table 1.  Percentage of moves within and across districts and average migration distances 
by self-reported motive; all households 
 Motive 
Type of move  Job  Housing  Family  Other 
Total number of moves  791  3,268  1,062  721 
% of all moves  13.5  56.0  18.2  12.3 
% of moves with d >50 km  64.9  12.2  15.7  7.2 
      
Within district  30.5  87.9  76.0  85.9 
Between districts; d < 50 km  18.3  9.7  14.8  7.9 
Between districts; d ≥ 50 km  51.2 2.3 9.2 6.2 
      
Average between district distance (km)  180  50  96  103 
Source: SOEP 1985-2003   36
 
Table 2.  Migration rates and average distances, by household type; all moves >50 km 

















Annual migration rate (%)  2.07  2.08  0.54  0.17  0.63 
Avg. migration distance (km)  223  211  219  312  203 
Number of observations  9,122  10,920  15,015  2,370  33,045 
Source: SOEP 1985-2003   37
 
Table 3:  Average number of hours spent on housework, shopping, and childcare, by type 
of household and type of day 
 Workdays  Sundays 
Household type 
Men Women Men's 
Share 
n Men  Women  Men's 
Share 
n 
Without  children         
  Single man in lf  2.1      8,273 1.4      4,662
  Single woman in lf    2.8    7,990   1.9    4,406
  Couple, man in lf  1.1  6.3  14.8%  5,545 0.7  3.1  17.5%  3,393
  Couple, woman in lf  2.6  4.0  37.0%  2,002 1.0  2.6  24.7%  1,076
  Couple, both in lf  1.4  3.7  27.7%  15,722 1.0  2.6  26.6%  8,966
         
With  children         
  Single man in lf  3.1      849 5.4      431
  Single woman in lf    8.5    2,930   8.7    1,538
  Couple, man in lf  2.1  11.7  14.1%  9,470 3.8  9.4  25.3%  6,318
  Couple, woman in lf  6.7  6.6  47.6%  368 4.2  8.1  31.1%  220
  Couple, both in lf  2.5  9.3  20.7%  17,323 3.9  8.5  28.4%  9,723
Source: SOEP 1985-2003   38
 
Table 4.  Regression analysis predicting husband's share in time spent on housework in 
dual-earner couples, by type of day 




Covariate B  SE  B  β B  SE  B  β 
Average  age  -0.38 0.03  -0.18**  -0.50 0.04  -0.19** 
Age  difference  0.09 0.06 0.02**  -0.04  0.07 -0.01 
Male  education  -0.12  0.12 -0.02*  0.38 0.15 0.04** 
Female  education  0.71 0.13 0.09**  0.68 0.17 0.07** 
Male  wage  -0.12  0.02 -0.06**  0.02 0.03 -0.01 
Female  wage  0.10 0.02 0.04**  0.08 0.03 0.03** 
Married  -3.93 0.71  -0.07**  -4.59 1.08  -0.06** 
Children  in  household  -4.98  0.53 -0.13**  1.66 0.67 0.03** 
Per capita hh income (1000s)  0.09  0.04  0.04**  -0.04  0.06  -0.01 
Time  trend  0.14 0.04 0.04**  0.29 0.05 0.06** 
Constant  38.51 1.76    37.26 2.28   
Number of  observations  20,910  12,254 
Number of households  4,756  3,798 
R
2  .080 .074 
F  62.52** 47.57** 
Note: standard errors corrected for multiple observations on household level 
Age difference = husband's age minus wife's age 
*p < .10;  **p < .05 
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Table 5.  Logistic regression analysis predicting single households' propensity to migrate, 
by gender 
  Men Women 
Covariate Coeff.  SE  Odds  ratio
  Coeff. SE  Odds  ratio
 
Home  owner  -1.25 0.33  0.29**  -0.73 0.35  0.48** 
Lengh  of  residence  -0.01  0.02 0.99 -0.05  0.02 0.95** 
Age  -0.03 0.01  0.97**  -0.03 0.01  0.97** 
Children  present  -0.90 0.54  0.40* -0.78 0.21  0.46** 
Urban  area  -0.07 0.05  0.93* -0.10 0.04  0.90** 
Education  years  0.15 0.03 1.16**  0.19 0.03 1.20** 
Seniority  -0.06 0.02  0.94**  -0.07 0.02  0.93** 
Time  trend  0.02 0.02 1.02 -0.01  0.01 0.99 
Constant  -3.66 0.42    -3.54 0.42   
    
Number of observations  8,753  10,266 
Number of individuals  2,192  2,388 
Log-likelihood -868.17  -982.27 
Model χ
2  173.46** 280.12** 
Note: standard errors corrected for multiple observations on household level 
*p < .10;  **p < .05 
 
 Table 6.  Logistic regressions predicting the geographical mobility of dual-earner couples 








Covariate                Coeff. SE  Odds 
ratio
  Coeff. SE Odds 
ratio
  Coeff. SE Odds 
ratio
  Coeff. SE Odds 
ratio
 
Home  ownership                          -1.42 0.33 0.24** -1.52 0.43 0.21** -1.35 0.33 0.26** -1.54 0.43 0.21**
Length  of  residence
 
                         
                       
                       
                         
                       
              
                  
                 
                  
                  
                  
            
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                       
                       
            
           
           
         
       
-0.04 0.03 0.96 -0.04 0.02 0.96* -0.06 0.03 0.95** -0.05 0.02 0.95**
Average  age
 
-0.03 0.02 0.97* 0.02 0.02 1.02 -0.04 0.02 0.96** 0.02 0.02 1.02
Married 0.10 0.30 1.10 -0.32 0.33 0.73 0.13 0.30 1.13 -0.31 0.33 0.74*
Household  size
 
-0.12 0.12 0.89* 0.02 0.18 1.02 -0.11 0.12 0.89 0.01 0.17 1.01
Urban  area 0.01 0.23 1.01 0.17 0.25 1.18 0.06 0.23 1.06 0.26 0.25 1.30
Education
  Male  years  0.28 0.05 1.31** 0.09 0.06 1.09
  Female  years  -0.04 0.06 0.96 0.15 0.06 1.17**
  Low male/high female (α)  -0.07 0.49 0.92 1.33 0.39 3.78**
  High male/low female (β)  1.42 0.31 4.16** 1.03 0.39 2.81**
  High male/high female (γ) 
 
1.29 0.28 3.62** 1.39 0.32 4.03**
Senority
  Male  years  -0.02 0.02 0.98 -0.01 0.02 0.99
 Female  years  -0.07 0.03 0.93** -0.12 0.04 0.89**
  Low male/high female (α)  0.07 0.29 1.07 -0.16 0.29 0.85
  High male/low female (β)  -0.29 0.36 0.75 -0.73 0.43 0.48*
  High male/high female (γ) 
 
-0.68 0.36 0.51* -1.37 0.53 0.25**
Year 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 1.02 0.05 0.02 1.05**
  Constant
 
-5.73 0.80 -7.48 0.86 -3.36 0.56 -5.57 0.75
Number  of observations 19,037 10,420 19,037 10,420
Number  of households 4,478 3,752 4,478 3,752
Log-likelihood -535.06 -430.37 -548.50 -436.13
Model χ
2  116.20** 86.73** 101.78** 67.48**
Note: standard errors corrected for multiple observations on household level, high education = 12 or more education years; high seniority = 5 or more years with the same 
employer; * p< .10;  ** p< .05 Table 7.  Joint coding of male and female characteristics 
  Female education / seniority 
Male education / seniority  Low  High 
Low Baseline  α 
High  β  γ 
   1
Table 8.  Average combined commute-to-work distances (in km) of dual-earner couples, 
by education levels and gender role ideology 
Education levels  Traditional  Egalitarian 
Low male/low female   37.51  41.23 
Low male/high female   42.58  52.21 
High male/low female   44.01  51.11 
High male/high female   54.96  60.33 
Source: SOEP 1985-2003; author's calculations Appendix:  
 
Table A1.  Sample Description 
 single man     single woman in labor 
force  in labor force 
couple, man in labor 
force 
couple, woman in labor 
force 
couple, both 
in labor force 
Variable            Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean    SD
Male  age                      39.39 11.73 45.45 11.37 58.85 9.71 42.00 10.51
Male  education                     
               
          
                     
                     
              
          
                     
                   
                     
                     
          
           
12.05 2.84 11.34 2.71 10.84 2.41 11.70 2.70
Male  seniority
 
9.03 9.52 13.39 11.01 11.50 10.18
Female  age 40.06 12.82 43.01 11.93 53.39 8.86 39.12 10.14
Female  education 11.81 2.73 10.34 2.20 10.50 2.34 11.27 2.47
Female  seniority
 
7.40 8.74 12.04 10.49 7.30 7.99
Household  Size
 
1.41 0.87 1.77 1.00 3.71 1.37 2.69 1.05 3.22 1.13
Urban  area 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.30 0.46 0.38 0.48 0.31 0.46
Home  ownership 0.21 0.40 0.22 0.41 0.47 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.50
Length  of  residence  (years)
 
8.03 10.42 9.28 11.37 12.99 11.80 18.87 14.83 10.37 10.70
N 9,122 10,920 15,015 2,370 33,045
Note: Numbers observation may vary due to missing values 
   1
Table A2.  Logistic regressions predicting the geographical mobility of dual-earner couples, alternative specifications of the egalitarian 
threshold 
  Threshold = .25  Threshold = .50 
  Model 1 (Traditional)  Model 2 (Egalitarian)  Model 3 (Traditional)  Model 4 (Egalitarian) 
Covariate                Coeff. SE  Odds 
ratio
  Coeff. SE Odds 
ratio
  Coeff. SE Odds 
ratio
  Coeff. SE Odds 
ratio
 
Home  ownership                          -1.48 0.57 0.22** -1.38 0.43 0.25** -1.60 0.37 0.20** -0.73 0.81 0.48
Length  of  residence
 
                         
                       
                       
                         
                       
            
                       
                       
                       
            
                       
                       
                       
                       
                     
            
           
         
       
-0.04 0.04 0.96 -0.05 0.02 0.95** -0.04 0.02 0.96** -0.08 0.02 0.93
Average  age
 
-0.03 0.02 0.97* -0.00 0.02 0.997 -0.03 0.02 0.97** 0.04 0.04 1.04
Married -0.11 0.42 0.89 -0.21 0.43 0.81 -0.03 0.33 0.97 -0.56 0.63 0.57
Household  size
 
-0.21 0.18 0.81* 0.02 0.19 1.02 -0.07 0.15 0.93** 0.04 0.27 1.04
Urban  area -0.15 0.35 0.86 0.20 0.30 1.22 0.07 0.26 1.07 0.18 0.50 1.20
Education 
  Low male/high female (α)  0.11 1.01 1.12 1.13 0.52 3.08** 0.51 0.72 1.66* 1.62 0.70 5.06**
  High male/low female (β)  1.29 0.43 3.62** 1.16 0.42 3.18** 1.21 0.34 3.36** 1.05 0.78 2.86*
  High male/high female (γ  1.06 0.44 2.88** 1.57 0.38 4.81** 1.30 0.33 3.68** 1.81 0.69 6.11**
Seniority 
  Low male/high female (α)  -0.08 0.44 0.92 0.04 0.37 1.04 0.07 0.33 1.08 -0.28 0.64 0.76
  High male/low female (β)  -0.61 0.55 0.54 -0.08 0.40 0.92 -0.24 0.35 0.79 -0.14 1.04 0.87
  High male/high female (γ) 
 
-0.30 0.48 0.74 -1.37 0.48 0.40* -0.69 0.38 0.50** -1.48 0.83 0.23**







-2.92 0.78 -4.79 0.67 -3.76 0.58 -5.41 1.13
N observations  15,245  16,478  28,110  3,613 
N households 4,042 4,760 5,588 1,946
Log-likelihood -412.72 -699.45 -905.99 -203.35
Model χ
2  80.59** 113.22** 141.09** 63.17**
Note: standard errors corrected for multiple observations on household level, high education = 12 or more education years; high seniority = 5 or more years 
with the same employer; *p < .10;  **p < .05 
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